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# Weekly Summary

NGA Review Complete

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CG WS 77-021  
May 27, 1977

Copy **Nº** **64**

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May 27, 1977

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Current Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence, and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly, [redacted]

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USSR

### Leadership Changes

The removal of Soviet President Podgorny from his duties as a member of the ruling Politburo almost certainly is the result of a fight within the leadership. The issues most likely to have been involved include the succession problem and the decision announced on May 23 to publish a draft of the new constitution for public discussion.

The phrasing of the announcement of Podgorny's removal, made at the Central Committee plenum held in Moscow this week, makes it clear that his departure from the Politburo was involuntary and foreshadows his replacement as chief of state by the time the USSR Supreme Soviet convenes on June 16. Podgorny's departure is the first open break in the group of senior leaders who have managed the Soviet Union's affairs since Khrushchev's ouster and could affect the eventual succession to General Secretary Brezhnev.

For the moment there is no good explanation—other than Kremlin politicking over the succession problem and the draft constitution—for Podgorny's removal. He enjoyed some success during his recent trip through Africa, and he has generally avoided taking an independent public stand on policy issues during the years that he has held his largely honorific post as chief of state. While there have been signs in the past that Podgorny disagreed with some aspects of Brezhnev's detente policy and had his own view of the proper balance between the governmental ministries and the local legislatures in supervising the economy, there has been no evi-



*Podgorny (l) with Brezhnev at a parade*

AP

dence of a serious breach between Podgorny and Brezhnev.

The clearest sign of a significant gain for Brezhnev from Podgorny's ouster would be for the General Secretary to assume the presidency himself while remaining as head of the party. Brezhnev could also use the vacancy to resolve the succession problem. If he, for example, arranged to have Party Secretary Kirilenko—long regarded as the most likely successor to Brezhnev—become president, Kirilenko would probably be effectively sidetracked, allowing Brezhnev to hand-pick his successor.

The plenum also removed Konstantin Katushev from the Party Secretariat—a largely pro forma move in view of his appointment in March as a deputy premier—and replaced him on the Secretariat with Konstantin Rusakov, a former staff aide of Brezhnev. It failed, how-

ever, to remove Minister of Defense Ustinov from that body. In the absence of any other explanation, Ustinov's retention on the Secretariat suggests a conscious effort to avoid upsetting the balance among the senior secretaries at a time when maneuvering to place proteges advantageously has already begun.

### Constitution

The announcement that a new draft constitution had been approved by a constitutional commission headed by Brezhnev represents an important element in Brezhnev's efforts to secure his own place in Soviet history. The project has had a long and troubled history, involving intense political controversy.

A draft constitution was first proposed by Khrushchev in 1959. Its original relatively revisionist, anti-Stalinist cast was scrapped when Khrushchev was ousted in 1964, but the momentum for

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a new constitution continued under Brezhnev's chairmanship. Brezhnev promised a draft in 1966 and again in 1972; in his speech at the 25th party congress last year, he explained defensively that work on the draft constitution "is being carried out carefully, without haste, so as to weigh as exactly as possible every problem."

[redacted] one of the many problems was the degree to which the role of the Communist Party should be delineated. The present constitution makes only two references to the party: it is to act as the guiding force of all social organizations, and it is to nominate all candidates for office. Some of the drafters reportedly wanted the duties and role of the party spelled out more precisely. Others wanted them left purposely vague, fearful that greater precision could be used to restrict the party's power.

Another issue reportedly involved a different approach to a "bill of rights." Some Soviets evidently believe that the document should retain emphasis on the power of the state.

Other broad themes have emerged in discussions in journals and the press. One is the conflict, troublesome to planners and managers, between the political-administrative boundaries of republics, krais, and oblasts, and the economic regions that cut across these boundaries. Another is the proper role of local legislatures regarding industries located in their territories but responsible to central ministries in Moscow.

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## Africa

## ZAIRE 10-14; 15-16

Moroccan-backed Zairian troops have continued to recapture territory from the Katangan invaders in Zaire's Shaba Region. Now that the Zairians have reached the Angolan border in the southwest, the Moroccan contingent is expected to return home soon.

The Zairians captured the mining town of Kisenge and the border town of Dilolo late last week and claimed this week to have taken Sandoa and Kapanga, the last Katangan-held towns. Some Katangans probably remain in the countryside.

During a visit to Zaire last weekend, Morocco's foreign minister said that the mission of the Moroccan troops had ended, although he did not indicate when they would depart. Moroccan King Hassan may want to bring home some of his victorious troops before he holds national elections on June 3.

Recent Zairian success in Shaba has apparently prompted a decision not to



use the Egyptian pilots, technicians, and medical personnel sent to Zaire last month. The Egyptians are expected to depart soon.

Little information is available on what has happened to the 2,000 Katangans estimated to have invaded Shaba. Some have escaped into Zambia along with other refugees from Shaba. Others may have fled into the bush, and some may have crossed back into Angola. It is also possible that they plan to rekindle the conflict once the Moroccans have departed. *A discussion of the outlook for the Katangan invaders now that they have been pushed back appears in the feature section of this publication.*

## Middle East

## ISRAEL 36/37

The shape and style of the new government that will emerge as a result of the May 17 election victory by the right-wing Likud party are still unclear. Party leader Menachem Begin probably could put together a cabinet with the hawkish National Religious Party and several small conservative groups, but he wants to broaden his coalition as much as possible to secure a strong working majority in the parliament.

Negotiations to this end with the new Democratic Movement for Change, however, were temporarily suspended this week following Begin's offer of the foreign ministry portfolio to Moshe Dayan, a hard-liner in the Labor Alignment, which lost its 30-year control of the government in the election. The Alignment decided against cooperation with Likud in a coalition, but Dayan, a former defense minister, agreed in principle to accept the portfolio.

Begin probably hopes that Dayan will

be able to rally support for Likud in the parliament from conservative Labor deputies, in effect padding the majority held by the Likud bloc at least on Arab-Israeli issues. Begin, moreover, probably values Dayan's experience in earlier negotiations with the Egyptians and Syrians and believes that the former defense minister's considerable popularity in the US will help counter concern in Washington and among some Jewish-American interest groups that a Likud-led government will be intransigent or extremist.

Begin's hospitalization last week because of fatigue—coming in the wake of the serious heart attack he suffered during the campaign—has injected an additional element of uncertainty into Israeli politics. His illness has raised doubts as to whether he has the stamina necessary to put together and lead a new government.

Begin has ruled the Israeli right wing as an autocrat for over 30 years, assiduously rooting out all serious challengers to his authority and grooming no one to succeed him. Should he become seriously incapacitated, however, Ezer Weizman, second in command of Begin's Herut faction, has an edge over the leader of the party's Liberal faction, Simcha Ehrlich, who reportedly does not want to be prime minister.

Apprehension about Likud's victory and Begin's tough statements is also fueling new media attacks on Israel in all the Arab countries. The more moderate Arabs, however, are playing down the significance of the election, an indication that they are determined to maintain the momentum toward a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. At the same time, they are reemphasizing the need for increased US pressure on Israel. Arab militants, such as Iraq, which have steadily opposed any peaceful settlement with Israel, have welcomed the Likud victory as confirming their view of Israel as an "expansionist entity" and justifying the "rejectionist" position.

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tling factor into pre-election politics.

The five Basque prisoners freed by Prime Minister Suarez on the condition that they go into exile arrived in Brussels on May 22. All of the 18 remaining Basque prisoners, most of them imprisoned for acts of terrorism—have taken the first steps in having their cases processed—formally requesting pardons or, failing that, exile.

The major Basque political parties have characterized the decision to exile the most controversial prisoners as “less than the full amnesty sought” but have publicly acknowledged that the government’s move has defused the issue. Both the Basque Nationalist Party and the Basque Socialist Party have affirmed their intention to participate in the June 15 parliamentary election. Even some of the more radical Basque groups, which had earlier said they would withdraw from the contest, are now having second thoughts.

The Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization, or at least some faction of that terrorist group, seems intent on making a last-ditch attempt to derail the election process. A member of the group reportedly called a radio station to take credit for the kidnaping last week of a conservative Basque industrialist and for the murder of a policeman in San Sebastian on May 19. The telephone caller vowed that the Fatherland and Liberty group would continue its armed struggle against the police and the “oligarchy.” The Basque Nationalist Party claims to have information that “ultra-left Basque elements” are planning to kidnap a senior party leader.

Right-wing terrorists also have an interest in seeing the pre-election atmosphere disrupted and have recently become more active—especially in the Basque region, where they have retaliated for Basque terrorist actions. With the Basque parties, as well as the Communists and Socialists, calling for an end to the violence, the terrorists have little chance of seriously disrupting the election.

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Europe

SPAIN

The Spanish government’s move last week to send five Basque prisoners into exile appears to have calmed the situation in those northern provinces where demonstrations demanding amnesty for political prisoners had injected an unset-

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President Kekkonen at press conference

## FINLAND-USSR 46-47

Finnish President Kekkonen signed an unprecedented 15-year trade pact with the Soviets in Moscow in mid-May and concluded another agreement for joint development of the Kostamus mining project in the USSR near the Finnish border. The new agreements may permit Finland to strengthen ties with its Scandinavian neighbors without appearing to compromise Finnish neutrality.

The Finns are now almost totally dependent on Soviet petroleum, for example, and might fare better economically if they were tied into a Nordic energy scheme. The Soviets might not object to such a move if they had new long-term economic commitments from Helsinki to serve as a balance to any such Nordic arrangement.

Kekkonen's recent gestures to the Soviets could also be an effort to tidy up loose ends—ensuring neutrality and strengthening economic ties—prior to his retirement. Just before he departed for the Soviet visit, his first trip since 1969, Kekkonen hastily arranged the installation of a majority government—a five-party, center-left coalition headed by Social Democratic Party leader Sorsa. The President had made it clear for some time that he wanted a majority coalition to provide a better base of do-

mestic support, and the minority Miettunen government obliged the week before his trip by resigning to make way for a new majority coalition.

Although Kekkonen has been endorsed by all the major Finnish parties and is certain to win the presidential election next year if he runs, he has not made his plans known. He will be 77 in September, and he completed 21 years as President last March. Kekkonen would like to avoid even the comparatively light criticism that would be raised by small radical parties in a campaign. He is aware of the undemocratic aspects of being appointed by special parliamentary legislation, as he was in 1974 when his term was extended for four years.

## FRANCE 48-54

France has abandoned the technology policy developed under former president de Gaulle, which called for technological independence. In its place is a new strategy designed to make France a technological leader among countries with comparable resources. National programs in such areas as civil aviation, computers, telecommunications, and nuclear energy have been re-evaluated and restructured. The new policy is

likely to be more successful than the Gaullist approach because the objectives are more consistent with available resources.

De Gaulle believed France could attain its "proper" role in world affairs only if it had an independent capability in a wide range of high technologies. Under President Giscard, the government has undertaken a review of large national technology programs, with a view to redefining objectives and making them more consistent with French resources.

An important element of the new French strategy—called Frenchification—is the use of the government's purchasing power to induce foreign-owned subsidiaries to sell a portion of their equity to French-controlled interests. French equity purchases often are followed by mergers with the foreign firms to ensure further French control as well as to facilitate technology transfer to the French.

The French recognize the importance of independence in technology; many of their cooperative arrangements with foreign partners exclude areas in which the French feel that they can develop a competitive position independently. Where there is cooperation, the French may be attempting to transfer enough technology to French control so that if the cooperation agreement ends, French industry will not be left behind.

A major change from Gaullist policy has been the government's recognition that US technology can be an essential ingredient in any successful technology strategy. This has led to direct cooperation with US firms—in civil aircraft, for example—and to the purchase of equity in US subsidiaries based in France in the telecommunications, computer, and nuclear energy industries.

French cooperation with the US is putting pressure on other European countries either to seek US partners or to commit themselves to more effective European cooperation.

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Asia


## PAKISTAN

New attempts were made this week to resolve the 10-week-old political crisis in Pakistan. These efforts apparently included an initiative by Saudi Arabia, which provides substantial economic assistance to Pakistan and is in a good position to exert leverage on both the government and the opposition. Opposition leaders must reach agreement among themselves, however, before an overall resolution will be possible.

Abdul Qayyum Khan, a veteran politician and a spokesman for the opposition Pakistan National Alliance, appeared hopeful during a week of conferences with several other opposition leaders that the country was finally moving toward a peaceful resolution of the problem. He said Saudi Arabia had played a vital role in changing the situation, but gave no details. The Saudis are apparently working behind the scenes along with other important Muslim states, including Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

Last weekend, a leading newspaper that is usually well-informed about opposition affairs reported that formal negotiations between Prime Minister Bhutto and the opposition leaders, most of whom are in jail, were expected to begin again soon. The newspaper was optimistic that Bhutto's recent proposals to his opponents could break the deadlock between the two sides. Opposition leaders, meanwhile, were reportedly preparing a proposal of their own to present to Bhutto this week.

The optimism of Qayyum and the press may be misplaced; at least one other opposition leader was markedly less hopeful. Several other recent initiatives have foundered on irreconcilable demands—and on the inability of the leaders of the nine groups in the opposi-



Abdul Qayyum Khan

tion alliance to agree on a unified negotiating position.

One of the principal barriers to opposition unity has been disagreement over a formula for allowing Bhutto to remain in office, at least temporarily, while restricting his power to control the government.

## JAPAN-CHINA

China has been inviting Japanese defense specialists and retired military officers to visit China recently, with a view to:

- Selling Peking's anti-Soviet views to a broad spectrum of Japanese.
- Capitalizing on the recent deterioration in Tokyo's ties with Moscow.
- Responding to Japanese interest in warming the bilateral climate.

The contacts have been very limited. The Japanese government clearly has no intention of adding a security dimension to its links with Peking, despite its desire to improve overall Sino-Japanese relations.

Over the last two months, the Chinese have entertained a number of relatively influential "defense intellectuals,"

including a faculty member of the National Defense College—the first such visit by a Defense Agency official since World War II. Although the influence of these officials on defense policy is limited, the Chinese presumably hope to exploit their knowledge as well as their contacts with politicians and bureaucrats.


A delegation of retired Imperial Navy and Maritime Self-Defense Force officers representing the Sea Power Research Society—part of Tokyo's domestic defense lobby—also visited China this month. Peking values these officers as potential sources of information on Japanese planning as well as for their political influence.

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### JAPAN-USSR

Tokyo and Moscow agreed last week to finesse the politically sensitive Northern Territories issue in the current fisheries negotiations between the two countries. On May 24, the two sides initiated an interim fisheries accord. The negotiators can now move on to the difficult problem of fishing quotas.

The talks had been stalled for almost three months because of Moscow's efforts to secure Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Northern Territories—a group of islands northeast of Japan seized by the USSR at the end of World War II. Tokyo has always maintained that the islands are Japanese territory. The new agreement will be restricted to fishing matters and allows the Japanese to maintain that they have not abandoned their claim to these islands.

The problem of Japanese fishing quotas probably will not be resolved quickly. The Japanese catch more than three times as much fish in Soviet waters as Soviet fishermen take from Japanese waters, and the Soviets are pushing for the concept of a balanced catch between the two sides. Tokyo is pushing for an agreement based on the status quo but is almost certainly resigned to substantial reductions in its catches in Soviet waters.

Moscow's tough posture in the negotiations has been motivated by a desire to maintain a firm stance on the territorial problem, by a reluctance to set quotas for the Japanese without knowing more about how Soviet fishing activity will be curtailed as a result of similar restrictions elsewhere, and by a belief that it pays to bully the Japanese. This behavior, however, united practically all Japanese behind their government and brought Soviet-Japanese relations to a new low.

The Soviets seem resigned to having poorer political relations with Japan than either the US or China has, but they do not want to drive the Japanese into an alliance with China. Recent talks by the Japanese about concluding a long-deferred peace treaty with China may have prompted Moscow to decide that its hard-nosed tactics in the fisheries negotiations were reaching the point of diminishing return. *A discussion of*


the economic impact on Japan and the USSR of the proliferation of national 200-mile maritime fishing zones appears in the feature section of this publication.

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### Western Hemisphere

### EASTERN CARIBBEAN

Marxist-oriented radicals are making a strong push for power on islands in the eastern Caribbean. These challengers, many of whom were active in the Caribbean black-power movement a decade ago, now are turning increasingly to conventional electoral politics. Any success they have will probably mean an in-



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crease in Cuban influence.

On *Grenada*, the Marxist-oriented New Jewel Movement joined forces with two centrist parties last year in an effort to defeat Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The coalition was narrowly defeated in the December election, but it still has an outside chance of replacing Gairy in the near future.

On *St. Lucia*, one of the five British Associated States, a Marxist politician named George Odum has gradually worked his way up to a position of influence in the major opposition party. Only last-minute maneuvering kept him from becoming party leader early this year, and he is generally conceded a strong chance of eventually assuming power.

On *Barbados*, a group of Marxist university activists led by an able organizer and orator named Ralph Gonzalves has joined with young members of the opposition party in an attempt to steer the party on a leftist course.

On *Dominica*, Roosevelt Douglas, a long-time black power advocate and a stalking horse for Havana, has ingratiated himself with Premier Patrick John in the hope of steering him on a leftward course.

Limited resources and frequently worsening economic conditions, combined with populations that include large percentages of young people, have significantly improved the radical left's prospects in the eastern Caribbean. Cuba clearly stands to gain from the trend. Many of the emerging leaders have been favorably impressed during visits to Cuba or influenced by contacts elsewhere with Cuban officials.

In some cases, Havana may have helped persuade the leftists that participating in conventional politics is the best course. This advice has been reinforced by the Jamaican experience, in which young radicals have gained a strong position in the ruling party and exert considerable influence over Prime Minister Michael Manley. [REDACTED]

## BRAZIL

The Brazilian government is seriously concerned about renewed political activism by students. University students in several parts of the country have recently staged a series of demonstrations, initially to protest academic conditions but increasingly to make political demands. So far, security officials have responded with restraint.

Recent campus protests involved thousands of students in a number of major cities demanding increased political liberalization and the release of students and workers arrested in earlier protests. The demonstrations were by far the largest since the late 1960s, when student activism and leftist subversion—against a backdrop of economic uncertainty—posed a critical test for the government.

In the ensuing years, subversion was wiped out, the students were cowed, and the so-called economic miracle took hold. More recently, however, economic problems have again increased, and the regime has faced renewed questioning of its performance by politicians, businessmen, and labor.

President Geisel had initially sought to liberalize his government with a view toward building greater public support. More recently, he has felt obliged, both by changing circumstances and by pressure from conservative military colleagues, to take increasingly tougher measures. His recent temporary closure of congress and subsequent decrees assuring government control of elections have apparently been deciding factors in turning the students' concerns from largely academic matters to more fundamental political questions.

The size and scope of the protests seem to have surprised the government and probably have contributed to a sense of alarm among security officials. Those officials not only apparently disagree as to the origins of the protests, but they are also uncertain how to handle future student problems. For many mili-

tary officers, however, the current situation is a painful reminder of the late 1960s, and at least some in the military are bound to renew the call for stringent security measures. [REDACTED]

## CHILE

The Chilean government is reverting to the repressive practices that have jeopardized its international standing since the 1973 military intervention. Reports of gross violations of human rights in Chile had nearly ceased since the beginning of the year but are once again on the rise.

This backsliding comes at a particularly bad time for Chile. A number of Western governments were beginning to acknowledge improvement in the Chilean human rights situation, and the boycott issue was beginning to fade.

Chile's National Intelligence Directorate is apparently behind the recent upsurge in torture, illegal detentions, and unexplained "disappearances." The Directorate's chief is a close confidant of President Pinochet, however, and he is unlikely to act without the President's knowledge. Pinochet himself stated this week that the emergency measures in effect under the state of siege will be enforced as long as necessary "to repress drastically any attempt that might become a threat to internal security or domestic peace."

The directorate's detention facility at Cuatro Alamos is said to be in operation again. This site was largely abandoned after a decree in January 1976 empowered the Supreme Court president and the interior minister to inspect—without prior notice—areas suspected of being used for torture.

Most of the targets appear to be Socialists, but some Communists and Christian Democrats are also included. A campaign against leaders of the Communist Party last year largely immobilized that organization, and the security services are apparently turning to other opponents. [REDACTED]

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*Nigeria in recent years has adopted a more active and militant stance toward white-ruled southern Africa. The Nigerians are suspicious of US motives in Africa and are seeking a wider role in the Third World as a whole.*

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## Nigeria: Foreign Policy Ambitions

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Nigeria's military leaders are acutely conscious that Nigeria—with the largest population in Africa and oil revenues exceeding \$8 billion a year—has the potential to be a leading political force in Africa and an important voice in world affairs. The leaders are a group of young nationalistic officers anxious to change Nigeria's generally pro-Western stance for one of uncompromising nonalignment. They were brought to power by the overthrow of the moderate Gowon government in July 1975 and have set the country on an increasingly assertive course, claiming a leading role in Africa so aggressively that some African states are uneasy about Nigerian intentions.

Nigerian foreign policy is subject to internal debate between rival factions within the ruling 23-man Supreme Military Council. Policy determination, theoretically the responsibility of the External Affairs Ministry, is increasingly influenced by a government-supported study group known as the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The group's director, Dr. Bolaji Akinyemi, has become one of the government's most influential civilian advisers.

### African Policy

Nigeria's shift in recent years to a more activist position against white minority rule in southern Africa has coincided with a growing involvement in the Organization of African Unity. Nigeria now has an

influential voice in the OAU and increasingly exerts its leadership there. It is an active participant in the UN Economic Commission for Africa and is the largest capital subscriber to the African Development Bank.

Nigerian leaders view white minority rule in southern Africa as a moral issue and tend to see Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa as a single problem. They are skeptical that negotiations by outsiders can result in majority rule and believe that intensified armed struggle may be the only solution.

Nigeria's shift to a militant policy on southern Africa began with its decision in late 1975 to recognize the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement in Angola. The key factor in the decision was South Africa's intervention in Angola on behalf of the Popular Movement's foes, although Nigeria also believed a Popular Movement government in Angola would be more likely to push hard for majority rule in southern Africa.

The Nigerians do not like to admit that the Cubans played and continue to play a necessary role in support of the Popular Movement. In part to reduce the Neto regime's dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans, Nigeria reportedly has extended to Angola some \$22 million in cash and another \$100 million in long-term credits. Nigeria has also provided limited military aid, plus a small police training team. Nigeria regards the

Popular Movement's victory in Angola as a triumph of Nigerian diplomacy.

On Rhodesia, the Nigerians maintain that any transition government must be controlled from the outset by Rhodesian nationalists, including representatives of the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union, to which most of the guerrilla forces belong. Nigeria believes that meaningful constitutional talks on a transfer of power can begin only when such a transition government is installed.

Nigeria is determined to be actively involved in Rhodesia. Financial and military aid to the Rhodesian nationalists has grown, and leaders of the front-line states have been invited to Nigeria, both to exchange views on southern African developments and to use Lagos as a forum for liberation pronouncements. The front-line states welcome Nigeria's increased militancy but fear that a significantly greater Nigerian involvement could reduce the leading role they play. The front-line leaders who have visited Lagos have found the Nigerians poorly informed on developments in southern Africa.

On Namibia, the Nigerians support the South-West Africa People's Organization as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people. SWAPO was the first African liberation group to be permitted to open a liaison office in Lagos.

On South Africa, Nigeria publicly

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favors an international boycott. Twice last year, Nigeria called on oil-producing nations to impose an oil embargo against South Africa. Nigeria has warned multinational companies against investing in South Africa's bantustans.

Nigeria has begun to champion the cause of the Pan-Africanist Congress, one of two outlawed black insurgent organizations suppressed inside South Africa and operating rather ineffectively among exiles. Nigeria has also agreed to provide secondary schooling in Nigeria for 250 student refugees from South Africa selected by the rival African National Congress.

#### Third-World Role

Nigeria is trying to carve out a wider role for itself in the Third World as a whole. It seeks to play a leading part in the nonaligned movement and, last year, gained a seat in the movement's policymaking body. It has also been a leader of the developing countries at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris.

The government views its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries as its single most important foreign association. Relations with the Arab world, however, are not particularly close. Unless the Arabs step up support for southern African nationalists, Nigeria may mute its support for Arab positions.

Determined to keep relations with the major powers on a pragmatic, issue-oriented basis, Nigeria strives for a balanced relationship with those states and will not depend on cooperation with any single developed country. It strongly desires to avoid non-African entanglements, particularly any that might tie Nigeria to either of the major power blocs. Nigerians criticize the Western powers for not adopting stronger measures against the white minority governments in southern Africa; they generally distrust the communist powers.

#### Relations with the US

Nigerians have long regarded the US as the major power most able to bring change internationally, but also the one

they differ with over the widest range of substantive issues.

Many Nigerians are suspicious of US motives in Africa, a skepticism that is rooted in US policies toward the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1971. The US embargo of arms shipments to Nigeria at that time, the low-key US support for the federal cause, and wide public sympathy for Biafra in the US all offended Nigeria. Major differences over Angola last year fortified the notion that US policy toward Africa is shaped mainly by US determination to counter communism and to protect US private investments in South Africa.


In the economic and military spheres, relations between the US and Nigeria are good. Nigeria is the second-ranking supplier of oil to the US, providing more than 18 percent of US oil imports last year. The US takes a large share of Nigerian oil exports—some 40 percent—and Nigeria relies on the

revenue from the US for a major share of its development funds.

The US is Nigeria's third most important source of imports. US investments in Nigeria, worth close to \$1 billion, are almost all in petroleum and, in sub-Saharan Africa, are second in value only to those in South Africa.

Although the Nigerians have now decided to train most of their military officers at home, they still prize military training programs in the US for some officers, and Nigeria pays the bills. Nigeria has recently signed substantial contracts with US firms for some noncombat military equipment.

Nigeria's activist foreign policy poses problems for the US now and for the future. In international forums, Nigeria will continue to oppose the US on many questions, including southern Africa, Third World economic demands, and nonaligned political issues.



Offshore oil rig, Nigeria

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*Moscow is intent on limiting criticism of the Soviet record on human rights at the Belgrade conference next month, and the current crackdown on dissidents is part of Soviet preparations for the conference.*

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## USSR: Objectives at the Belgrade Conference

On June 15, representatives of the states that took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will meet in Belgrade to prepare for the first follow-up meeting to the Helsinki conference of 1975. The Belgrade session—which is likely to last about six weeks—will determine the opening date, duration, agenda, and other arrangements for the full meeting, which will take place in the fall, also in Belgrade.

The mood in Moscow differs markedly from what it was in the period before the Helsinki summit, which was the successful culmination of a long Soviet diplomatic offensive.

The Helsinki meeting was intended by the Soviets to produce full and binding Western recognition of the postwar borders in Europe, to win acceptance of the idea that the USSR has a legitimate right to be heard on broad European issues, and to establish a pattern of bilateral and multilateral economic and technological cooperation that would facilitate the USSR's access to the coveted technology of the West.

The Final Act of the Helsinki conference satisfied all these Soviet objectives, at least in part, but the USSR now is clearly on the defensive.

### **Moscow's Difficulties**

Moscow's present difficulties stem from its failure to assess accurately the significance of the concessions it made at Helsinki. The Soviets gave ground both in

accepting measures providing for prior notification and observation of major military maneuvers—the so-called confidence-building measures—and in accepting the human rights guarantees contained in Basket III and Principle 7 of the Final Act.

These pledges have been seized upon by dissidents throughout Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself. The dissidents have differing objectives, but they share a willingness to demand that their governments live up to the obligations they assumed at Helsinki. At the same time, the ability of these governments to repress dissidence by force is hampered by the spotlight thrown on their actions by the Helsinki agreement and by their knowledge that draconian actions could undermine Western support for detente.

The Belgrade conference was undoubtedly discussed when the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers met in Moscow earlier this week. The meeting was the latest in a series of Soviet efforts to coordinate strategy and tactics for Belgrade, especially on human rights.

### **Soviets Hope to Defuse Issue**

Moscow's main objective at Belgrade will be to forestall or limit criticism of its failure to implement the human rights clauses of the Helsinki agreement and to prevent any expansion of the Final Act's provisions for facilitating the exchange of people and ideas in Europe. This objective takes precedence over any hopes the Soviets have for progress on political or

economic cooperation.

The Soviet emphasis has been clear from Soviet diplomatic efforts to tell Westerners what the Belgrade meeting should not consider, rather than what it should. Soviet diplomats making the rounds of Western capitals in the past few weeks have all carried essentially the same message: the Belgrade meeting must not be turned into a "tribunal" to pass judgment on how the signatories have carried out the provisions of the Final Act. To do so, they warn, would risk a "confrontation" that would frustrate the purposes of the conference and could even revive the tensions of the cold war.

The Soviets can be expected to accompany the diplomatic campaign with efforts to cripple the dissident movement before the Belgrade meeting begins. The coming of the meeting at least partly accounts for the intensified arrests, harassment, and exile of leading dissidents—virtually decapitating the Soviet human rights movement since the beginning of the year.

### **Likely Soviet Tactics**

At Belgrade, the USSR will almost certainly push for a meeting of limited duration, a short agenda, and an emphasis on generalities over specifics. The Soviets are especially intent on heading off Western efforts to expand on the human rights guarantees agreed to at Helsinki. If they cannot prevent a review of implementation, they will push for closed-door sessions and for strict limitations on dis-

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cussion.

In diplomatic contacts so far, the Soviets have stressed the importance of arriving in Belgrade with a "positive political concept." They have not spelled out what they have in mind, but presumably they are thinking of a generalized reaffirmation of detente and East-West cooperation. They would no doubt be satisfied if the principal achievement of the Belgrade meeting were a general agreement to settle for this at the meeting in the fall.

If their efforts to sidetrack Basket III issues are unavailing, the Soviets will be prepared to defend their record and to go on the attack. The statistics they have

gathered to defend their record are heavily weighted in favor of such categories as numbers of books translated and published, films imported, and so on. They will also be prepared to attack the Western record on implementation, using such issues as West German bars to employing communists in government, US visa and immigration restrictions, and the US record on race relations.

The Soviets are also likely to argue that the West has failed to live up to the economic provisions of Basket II, citing the US failure to grant most-favored-nation treatment to the USSR and alleged restrictions on the opening of Soviet commercial establishments in the West. They

can also be expected to dwell on "social rights"—such as the rights to education and employment—which they charge are neglected in the West but guaranteed under their system.

#### Possible Soviet Proposals

The Soviets would prefer to avoid exchanges on implementation—they know they are likely to come out poorly—by diverting the attention of the conference to more "positive" matters. By this they mean proposals that fit loosely into the categories of Baskets I and II. These include measures to promote political and military detente in Europe, as well as measures designed to facilitate economic, technical, and scientific cooperation.

On security, the Soviets are likely to propose agreements to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict and to prohibit the admission of new members to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both put forward at the Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest last November. Mutual force reductions may be raised at Belgrade in some form.

The Soviets will also be well prepared to talk about Basket II issues. The proposals for all-European conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment advanced by General Secretary Brezhnev at the Polish party congress in December 1975 are likely to be repeated, and the Soviets may surface a proposal made in February 1976 by the Council for Economic and Mutual Assistance to establish formal relations with the European Community.

To shift the focus from Basket III, the USSR may consider improvements in areas in which it previously had no interest. Confidence-building measures are the most conspicuous example of this; the Soviets have hinted at least once that they might be prepared to stop opposing improvements in procedures for the notification of military maneuvers. Similarly, they have indicated interest in a proposal, first made in Helsinki, for the peaceful arrangement of disputes in Europe.

It is also a good possibility that the Soviets may attempt to head off Western initiatives by proposing a ban on "inflam-



General Secretary Brezhnev (l) with Yugoslav President Tito

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matory" propaganda. In all likelihood, they will focus on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which have been the targets of increasingly violent propaganda attacks in recent weeks. They would no doubt cite the Final Act's prohibition of intervention, "direct or indirect," in the affairs of other signatory states.

**After Belgrade**

As matters stand, the Soviets are unlikely to introduce any of these proposals for the direct consideration of the conferees at Belgrade. To do so would open the way for Western counterproposals on

Basket III, and this is something they are most anxious to avoid. They have insisted firmly that new proposals are completely out of order for the meeting in June.

Presumably, they would prefer to suggest other means of handling these questions, such as the establishment of specialized working groups or conferences to consider these questions. This tack would also help deflect Western pressure for follow-up meetings to the conference in the fall. The Soviets have been deliberately vague on the question of such a follow-up conference, saying that they

will develop their position on the basis of the results and atmosphere at Belgrade.

There seems little doubt that they will be reluctant to submit themselves to the uncertainties of another open-ended conference if their situation remains as difficult as it is now. There is always the possibility, however, that they may succeed in mastering dissidence within the bloc, or that significant differences may develop in the Western camp, in which case their attitudes could change.

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*President Mobutu's government, with foreign support, is successfully pushing the Katangan invaders from Shaba Region. The Katangans will probably return to Angola where they may await new opportunities to harass the Zairian regime.*

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## Zaire: Outlook for the Invaders



President Mobutu in Shaba

AP

The invasion of Zaire by antigovernment exiles—the Katangans—is about to go down as a military failure unless they can quickly strengthen their position. They probably cannot.

The exiles' methodical advance into Shaba Region stopped last month just short of the vital copper-producing zone. Since then, they have lost ground in the face of the counteroffensive finally mounted by the Zairian army after Moroccan troops arrived to help them. The bulk of the 2,000 lightly armed invaders probably have already retreated back into Angola, and the Moroccans are hoping to head home soon.

What then of the invaders—those former military policemen in what is now Shaba, their new recruits, and other anti-Mobutu exiles? Their options depend, as before, on their hosts—the leftist government of Angola. In turn, Angola, because of its postwar feebleness, is heavily dependent on the USSR and Cuba.

Angola facilitated the invasion by giving a green light to the exiles, letting them depart with arms and supplies to challenge the Mobutu government in Zaire. Taking the stand that it was a Zairian “internal affair,” Angola nevertheless stood to gain in the event of success, as did its allies, from either the impairment or downfall of Mobutu—an adversary of Angolan President Neto and

a supporter of Neto's domestic enemies.

From the Angolan side of the border, the attraction of a move against Mobutu was too strong to resist. Leaders of the Katangans, who remained armed after helping the Angolan regime fight its way into power, were eager to go home and challenge Mobutu. They knew that Mobutu was unpopular, his army inept, his treasury virtually bankrupt. The border separating them from their relatives in Shaba was undefended. The US, judging by its post-Vietnam attitudes and performance during the war in Angola, would not send troops to help Mobutu. There was little risk and much to gain.

The invasion turned out to be “a piece of cake...a walk,” in the words of one military observer in Zaire. The exiles walked into Zaire and were welcomed by the Shabans, who hoped Mobutu's misrule of their region was about to end. Mobutu's local representatives panicked.

The venture could well have served as a catalyst, bringing about the collapse of Mobutu's shaky economic and political structure. That it did not succeed is a tribute to Mobutu's political skill and some newfound friends.

Mobutu, who owes his long tenure to his political adroitness, reversed the threat of collapse by converting his personal peril into an international one. He conjured up the “red threat.” By portraying

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the armed Zairians in Shaba as a Cuban-led, surrogate invasion force in a Soviet offensive against his weak country, Mobutu built up a supporting coalition of West European, African, and Arab countries that saw a need to discourage communist expansionism.

The scene of conflict, a remote corner of Zaire beyond the view of detached observers, and the exiles' vaguely socialist platform have fostered confusion about what is happening there. To leftists and anti-Mobutu Zairians, it is an internal "liberation struggle." To Mobutu's side, it is a Soviet-inspired "foreign aggression." The two interpretations have had a polarizing effect in Africa, to Mobutu's advantage.

Angola, which shared the exiles' hope of seeing Mobutu weakened or deposed, has witnessed instead the creation of a pro-Mobutu coalition including France, Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Angola—having gained nothing—has incurred suspicion that it is a Soviet stalking horse in Africa. Suspicion of Soviet and Cuban intentions in Africa has increased among moderate African leaders.

Mobutu's success in making his survival the concern of an array of more powerful states through his "me or communism" tactic has no doubt unsettled the exiles, the Angolans, and their allies. There is even evidence that the Angolans and Cubans are worried that Mobutu, no longer a pushover, might not halt his forces at the border.

Angola's Neto, facing continuing internal sabotage and serious insurgency problems of his own, is in no position to take on Mobutu and his newfound friends. Most likely, Neto would like the Shaba conflict to end as soon as possible, now that the exiles are falling back.

Neto probably would be reluctant to cooperate if the exiles in Shaba called for reinforcements from among the 4,000 or so Katangans remaining in Angola. He would also be reluctant to facilitate major incursions into other parts of Zaire. Such evidence of escalation could be used by Mobutu to strengthen his position further with the help of more foreign troops.

Most of the exiles have probably made their way back to Angola, their few losses in Shaba more than made up by hundreds of willing recruits. They will probably have to remain in Angola until Mobutu no longer rules Zaire or is crippled by economic and political setbacks. Small groups may harass Mobutu's forces in cross-border raids, with or without Angolan authorization. They may hope that an assassination team can accomplish what their invasion could not.

Back in Angola, the Katangans will again be a bargaining chip for President Neto, their existence serving to put pressure on Mobutu finally to renounce his support for Neto's enemies.

Other anti-Mobutu Zairians in Europe and Africa, their appetite aroused by the near-success in Shaba, are hoping to mount another campaign against him. They are traveling around, talking to each other, feeling that their time for action has arrived. Some believe that creation of a joint strategy and an appealing political platform could win them a measure of international support as an alternative to Mobutu's regime.

Linked only by their animosity toward Mobutu, and factionalized by political leanings, personal loyalties, and differing origins, they are likely to find that Mobutu retains the upper hand in today's Zaire.



*Zairian army troops ride a heavily camouflaged jeep in the Shaba area*

AP  
London

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